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The Contextualization of Paratactic Conditionals¹

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In recognition of the enthusiasm he has brought to all aspects of the study of spoken verbal interaction, we dedicate this series to Professor Dr. Aldo di Luzio, University of Konstanz.

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1. Introduction

For constructions like

(1) You drive like hell, you'll get there on time,

Haiman (1983 et passim) has coined the term *paratactic² conditional* (henceforth also *PC*). In (1) *you drive like hell* forms the protasis (or *p*) and *you'll get there on time* the apodosis (or *q*) of a conditional structure, which is synonymous³ with (1a)

(1a) If you drive like hell, you'll get there on time,

in a context in which the addressee is assumed to be not 'driving like hell' at the moment of the utterance and her/his only chance to arrive on time is 'to drive like hell', i.e. very fast, and no other behaviour will bring about the fulfilment of the states of affairs described in the consequent-clause.

One of the problems in connection with such constructions is how to identify and describe them analytically⁴, especially when compared to similar constructions in neighbouring cognitive domains, in particular temporality, causality and consecutivity⁵. Faced with a lexically minimally marked structure it is all the more important to define conditionality in a way that is independent of lexical and morpho-syntactic surface forms. One way of doing this is to conceptualize⁶ conditionality as involving (at least) the following four defining features: (a) the evocation of an alternative world⁷, (b) the speaker's epistemic stance towards the world presented in *p*, (c) a

² I use 'paratactic' partly in accordance with the traditional use of the term, i.e. for the connection of two clauses via parataxis. In a strict sense, however, this only includes clause combinations containing coordinating conjunctions such as *and*, *or* or *but*. I also subsume under this category structures which traditional grammar calls asyndetic juxtaposition, i.e. constructions without any linking element between the clauses at all.

³ Complete synonymy does not exist in a strictly functional approach to grammar, which I am advocating and in which any difference in form is supposed to correspond to a difference in function/meaning. (Cf. Givón 1985 et passim, Bolinger 1968, Linde 1976, Kuno passim, and Halliday passim) Rather, as I was able to show (cf. Thumm 1999), *paratactic conditionals* differ from their lexically marked counterparts, among other things, with respect to their discourse-pragmatic functions. (Cf. also below.) But for the sake of convenience I have accepted the paraphrase relation as a make-shift (as between (1) and (1a)) in order to be able to identify *PCs*. Cf. for the same procedure also Couper-Kuhlen (1999).

⁴ Apart from the question of how recipients recognize them. For details cf. p. 5 and passim.

⁵ For a detailed discussion cf. Thumm (1999: 89ff.): "4.2.2 *PCs* im Spannungsfeld von Konditionalität, Temporalität und Konsekutivität."

⁶ Informed by the mental-spaces model (Fauconnier) and based on Fillmore (1990) and Couper-Kuhlen (1999).

⁷ In accordance with Fillmore (1990) and Couper-Kuhlen (1999) I use the term 'alternative world' interchangeably with 'possible world', 'alternative', 'possible' and 'mental space' to describe the situation that a hypothetical state of affairs/world/space is opened up in the protasis of a conditional construction that departs from the present discourse world - the reality - of the participants. Dancygier & Sweetser (2000: 115) have given the term 'alternative space' the much more restricted meaning of referring only to the conversational implicature of 'conditional perfection' (cf. p. 2f. below), reserving 'mental space' for what has also been referred to as 'alternative' or 'possible world/space'.

contingency relation between p and q such that p constitutes a sufficient (and in most cases also a necessary) condition having as its consequence q or enabling q (cf. also Sweetser 1990 and Van der Auwera 1986). This, of course, tacitly presupposes something which seems to be self-evident, but should not be underestimated from an analytic point of view: The semantic and/or pragmatic relationship between the states of affairs expressed in the two clauses, together with the context in which they occur, is highly relevant in signalling the (conditional) relation holding between them. I.e. only if the semantics of the two clauses allows for a plausible conditional relationship in the given context does it make sense to speak of the two units as being conditionally connected. Only then do they have at least the potential of standing in a contingency-relationship.⁸ And, finally, (d) the non-facticity of p . I consider this last defining characteristic of conditionality, which has not been mentioned in the literature so far, as crucial for the description of *PCs*. That is, I treat *PCs* as conditional only if p is not factual, i.e. if the speaker's epistemic stance towards the world presented in the conditional protasis lies not at the upper extreme of the certainty continuum. In such a case we should rather speak of temporality, and, consequently, posit a separate (and, at least theoretically, separable) category of paratactic temporal constructions.⁹ In the protasis of (1) (and (1a)) the speaker (a) evokes an alternative world in which the addressee is imagined to increase his speed and (b) takes a neutral epistemic stance towards the state of affairs presented in p , i.e. he presents it as being open how probable the 'coming-true/becoming-a-fact' of *you drive like hell* is¹⁰. Furthermore (c) a contingency-relation holds between p (*you drive like hell*) and q (*you'll get there on time*) of the sort that IF and only IF/IFF (or \leftrightarrow in logic) p , then q , i.e. if not p , then not q , a phenomenon

⁸ Sequential proximity/adjacency alone makes two (seemingly independent) utterances relevant to each other. The exact nature of this relevancy-relationship is then established based on the semantics and/or pragmatics of the two clauses via processes of pragmatic inferencing, more precisely pragmatic enrichment/augmentation and the context in which they are uttered. This procedure in the interpretation of lexically unmarked (conditional) constructions can be seen as the synchronic equivalent of procedures that took (and take) place diachronically in the process of grammaticalization of connectives/conjunctions. (Cf. Hopper & Traugott 1993, especially 167ff.)

The following (constructed) sentences are relatively likely to be interpreted as involving a conditional relation merely by the fact that they consist of juxtaposed clauses that potentially can stand in an *if-then* relationship.

You do the shopping, (and) I'll wash the car.

You do the shopping, (and) I wash the car.

⁹ Couper-Kuhlen (1999), who has a similar, but slightly different conceptualization of conditionality, does not differentiate between temporality and conditionality in such cases, but rather, speaks of conditionality with an extremely high probability for p to become/be true, i.e. the speaker marking an extreme point on the epistemicity continuum. For the reasons mentioned above I consider temporality and conditionality as different and principally separable conceptual domains, which – with all their similarities and convergences – enable us to speak about alternative worlds. When working in the field of *PCs* I became more and more aware of the fact that many more concepts and logical relations can have non-lexical, paratactic-asyndetic means of coding. For causals in this respect cf. Gohl (2000).

¹⁰ In traditional terminology this would count as a realis-case, in my (1999) taxonomy this would be an indefinitus. Cf. *ibid.* for the reason(s) why I consider "realis" a misnomer for such cases.

which has been described by Geis & Zwicky (1971: 562) as "conditional perfection" or "biconditionality":

"A sentence of the form $X \supset Y$ invites an inference of the form $\sim X \supset \sim Y$.

[This] principle ... asserts a connection between linguistic form and a tendency of the human mind - a tendency to "perfect conditionals to biconditionals", in words suggested to us by Lauri Karttunen."

This conversational implicature is specific to natural language conditionals but does not hold for conditions in logic. Instead it has become conventionalized for the former to the point that it can be said to belong as an integral part to the meaning of *if* and/or the concept of conditionality in human language (as opposed to monotonic logic).¹¹ Finally (d), in (1) the protasis *you drive like hell* cannot in any reliable way be said to be clearly factual, for, in a context as outlined above, it is up to the addressee to react that way or not. The case is much clearer in (1a), which is explicitly marked with *if* and can therefore arguably be called non-factual, open or indefinite. In *PCs* this differentiation, and therefore also the distinction between paratactic conditional vs. temporal structures is, as mentioned above, often difficult to discern. But what can help to draw the line between the two is the observation that a pervasive system of framing and contextualization is at work which makes it possible to identify, process, understand, describe and analyze *PCs*. Not only does it make the identification of lexically unmarked structures possible for the analyst, but it also shows that speakers design their talk for their recipients by deploying multiple contextualization cues and that recipients, in turn, orient towards these cues. It is this system of *PC* contextualization that I want to have a closer look at in this article.¹² First, however, I'd like to review some of the conclusions drawn in an exploratory study of *paratactic conditionals* (Thumm 1999) as background for the present discussion.

As research on conditionals is massively - and on *paratactic conditionals* exclusively - based on constructed, decontextualized examples, I tried to compensate for this unsatisfactory state of affairs by submitting the literature to an empirical test and checking the hypotheses made there against real occurrences. I collected 159 examples of *PCs* from a data corpus of real spoken verbal interaction in American and British English¹³, which comprises altogether about 100 hours of talk. Some of the most important observations are: The ratio between lexically marked (with *and* and *or*, among others) and purely asyndetic *PCs* is 1:1. This does not correspond to the impression given in the literature, which has been primarily concerned with so-called conditional threats and promises, formed with *and* and *or* (cf. Fillenbaum passim). In about 80% of the

¹¹ For the reason(s) for this conventionalization process and the consequences for conditionals in different domains in the sense of Sweetser (1990) cf. Thumm 1999: 23ff. and 16ff. respectively.

¹² See also Thumm 1999: 121ff.

¹³ I was not concerned with the question of different varieties or genres in relation to (the frequency of occurrence of) *PCs*.

cases there is neither an imperative nor an imposition¹⁴ involved, showing that research has dealt only with a small subcategory of *PCs* and for the most part ignored types which are empirically attested to be much more frequent. The same holds for the subjects that (can) occur in the protasis: Contrary to the literature, according to which *PCs* (always) have the 2nd person singular with generic reference as subjects, more than 1/4 of the *PCs* in my corpus have subjects other than the 2nd person singular, and in 1/10 of the occurrences the *you* is not generic, but clearly specific and referential. Another tenet of the research on *PCs* which was invalidated or at least weakened was that a universal constraint is at work of the form that the protasis must always precede the apodosis in *PCs* (this is also claimed to be a strong tendency for *if*-clauses). My data suggest that the ordering *q-p* does occur, if rarely so, which shows that the hypothesis of *p* always preceding *q* can only be called a universal tendency, not a universal law even for paratactic conditional structures, although, due to their lack of (conjunctive) lexical marking, they could be expected to occur exclusively in the iconic ordering condition-consequent. In a further step, I tried to test *PCs* for categories developed in traditional and more recent research on conditional *if*-clauses. The data showed that in the majority of cases the speaker takes an indefinite ("realis") epistemic stance towards the proposition in *p*. However, there are also several instances of potentialis and irrealis-epistemicity, which means that all of the three (traditionally differentiated) points on the continuum of epistemicity are attested for *PCs*, a fact which has been denied in the literature. Furthermore, they also occur in all of Sweetser's (1990) domains, i.e. there are *PCs* on the content, epistemic and speech-act level. Yet according to the literature only the real-world-reading is possible. Finally, I found some instances of concessive *paratactic conditionals*, which, however, are not in a single case characterized by contrastive focussing or the so-called 'squeal-intonation' (Haiman 1986, Haspelmath & König 1998) ascribed to them as a typical feature in the literature.

Two main questions have not been answered, let alone raised, in connection with *PCs* – as a result, I think, of using constructed examples which lack real contexts. First, working on the assumptions of a strictly functional model of grammar, what are the specific discourse-pragmatic functions and uses of *PCs*, especially in comparison to their explicitly marked counterparts (among others those with *if*)? In Thumm (1999) it turned out that the functional hypothesis was confirmed: *PCs* which cannot be unmistakably attributed to one of the categories conditionality, temporality and consecutivity, with more than chance probability, exploit exactly this feature of a convergence/syncretism of categories, especially in contexts, where it is particularly apt to avoid a precise attribution to a specific category. Moreover, it was shown that *PCs* are "resumptive" in a special sense, i.e. they occupy a specific sequential

¹⁴ For the difference and the need to clearly differentiate between form and meaning/illocutionary force here cf. Thumm 1999: 31ff. & 54f.

position: they often occur as a conclusive remark in the form of a gnome repeating material from the preceding discourse and reformulating it in a concise and proverb-like fashion. Like idiomatic expressions they serve the function of so-called "terminal objects" (Drew & Holt 1988: 400), as has been described by Drew & Holt (1988) for idioms in complaints. In other words, they show "termination relevance", i.e. "the "summary" character" (Drew & Holt *ibid.* 406) typical of idiomatic expressions. It is this "topically terminal character" (*ibid.* 412) that lends them a particular value in topic management, as has been hypothesized by Drew & Holt (*ibid.* 416) to be generally the case for idioms in all environments. Apart from that, *paratactic conditionals* can serve the function of exemplifying a point previously made in discourse or marking a contrast to something that has gone before.

A second and even more basic question is how *paratactic conditionals* are recognized and interpreted by recipients and are to be identified by analysts. This question has not yet been asked in the literature, primarily because the context has not been taken into consideration nor the fact that *PCs* are uttered on real occasions of (spontaneous) verbal interaction. This has created the impression that *paratactic conditionals* are an easily identifiable and clearly defined closed category. But, as can be seen from examining empirical data, this is by no means the case. Therefore, the question that suggests itself is the following: How can the speaker signal to the recipient(s) that the two states of affairs in *p* and *q* stand in a conditional relationship, i.e. that a contingency relationship holds between the two, and that they do not simply constitute two totally unrelated statements which happen to be adjacent or which stand in a different semantic, e.g. temporal or consecutive, relation?

In what follows I will argue that a pervasive system of contextualization and framing guarantees the correct understanding of paratactic conditional constructions. 90% (144 out of 159) of the *PCs* in my data are contextualized in one way or another, i.e. there are various lexical as well as non-lexical means by which conditionality is signalled. Not only is this system pervasive but it also seems to work well; in not a single case does a problem of understanding become noticeable in the context of *PCs* (for example, there is no initiation of repair in their immediate linguistic context). Before presenting the single patterns attested in the data, let us first consider some points about contextualization and framing in general that are relevant for the present discussion.

2. Contextualization and framing

Contextualization tries to answer the question "by what means is an activity 'orchestrated' in order to be hearable as such" (Auer 1992: 5), or, by what means does the speaker signal to the recipient of an utterance the action performed by that utterance?

Contextualization is, accordingly, defined as:

"comprising all activities by participants which make relevant, maintain, revise, cancel... any aspect of context which, in turn, is responsible for the interpretation of an utterance in its particular locus of occurrence." (Auer *ibid.* 21)

This, according to Auer (*ibid.* 21), makes necessary an understanding of 'context' that is on the one hand *flexible*, and, on the other, *reflexive*: *flexible*, in that the context is continuously (re)shaped in (the) time (of the interaction), *reflexive*, in that language itself contributes to the construction of context.

Furthermore, according to contextualization theory, contexts are not given, i.e. they are not just 'there' as a set of pre-established, ready-made, unchangeable variables which participants at talk simply invoke; they are, rather, established together by the interactants and always intersubjectively (re)adjusted and recalibrated during the verbal exchange. Contextualization involves a dynamic notion of context ('context' is replaced by 'contextualization') and presupposes active participants who do not simply react to the context, but are actively engaged in constructing it themselves.¹⁵

Contextualization can, therefore, be understood as a pool of procedures which, through so-called contextualization cues, establish context and thus meaning for the utterance that is being produced at any moment:

"Contextualization cues are used by speakers in order to enact a context for the interpretation of a particular utterance. (...) ... context is ... "brought about"¹⁶ in interaction, [it is] "emergent"." (Auer 1992: 25; footnote MT)

According to Auer (1986: 24) such contextualization procedures establish a connection between two essential parts, i.e. an empirically given (observable) datum, the contextualization cue on the one hand, and a component of background knowledge, which is assumed to be organized in the form of 'schemata', 'frames' or 'scripts'¹⁷, on the other.¹⁸

¹⁵ " ... für die Interaktionsteilnehmer besteht die Aufgabe darin, (sprachliche) Handlungen auszuführen *und* zugleich interpretierbar zu machen, indem ein Kontext konstruiert wird, in den sie sich einbetten. (...) Kontext wird nicht als material gegeben, sondern als interaktiv produziert angesehen. Seine Realität ist nicht die einer physikalischen Präsenz, sondern die eines (Ethno-)Konstrukts, ... " (Auer 1986: 23; emphasis in the original)

¹⁶ For the question of whether context is 'brought about' or, rather, 'brought along' cf. the discussion in Auer 1992: 26.

¹⁷ For the use of these different notions cf. below.

Contextualization cues can be very different, i.e. they can be lexical, prosodic or kinetic (i.e. non-lexical) in nature. A further important differentiation to be made is with respect to the position contextualization cues take relative to the utterance to be contextualized by them: *anticipatory cues* precede the (yet-to-be) contextualized unit, *retrospective cues* follow it. (Cf. Auer 1992: 28) In most cases contextualization cues - which may differ with respect to their nature, position and the level at which they are working - occur cumulatively, i.e. they work together at establishing meaning, which leads to a redundancy of coding, called by Auer (ibid. 30) "multiplicity of coding". This facilitates the process of drawing inferences and guarantees understanding even in cases where one channel of signalling and perception is - for whatever reason - not available.¹⁸

A defining criterion of contextualization cues is that they are not referential in nature, i.e. they do not possess decontextualized meaning as we are used to find in lexical elements. From a semiotic point of view they are properly described as indexical signs: they 'hint at' or 'point to' frames/schemata/scripts, but they do not establish stable meaning-relationships as most linguistic signs do. They have meaning in specific contexts, but they cannot be ascribed referential, context-independent meaning. This is why it is "impossible to say what "high onset of intonational contour", "clapping hands", "gaze aversion", "code-switching into Italian" mean as such." (Auer 1992: 30; emphasis MT) Contextualization cues have an inherent meaning base, a meaning potential, which "may be conventionalized (arbitrary) or natural (non-arbitrary [i.e. iconic - MT]), or a mixture of both." (Auer ibid. 32) I will come back to this crucial differentiation in some detail in connection with intonation as a contextualization cue in *PCs*.

As far as function is concerned, contextualization cues are flexible, their signalling value is relational, so that one and the same cue may - depending on the respective context - very well have different signalling values, i.e. meanings. Gumperz (1992: 50) has referred to them as constraints:

"What is conveyed by such manoeuvres are constraints on interpretation which are independent of what is conventionally called the propositional meaning of ... [lexically coded - MT] strings [of discourse - MT]. Put differently, prosody and code-

¹⁸ "Kontextualisierungsverfahren sind also dadurch bestimmt, daß in ihnen bestimmte Kontextualisierungshinweise auf eine bestimmte Art eingesetzt werden, um Schemata aus dem Hintergrundwissen verfügbar zu machen. (...) Durch *Kontextualisierungsverfahren* werden Kontextualisierungshinweise und Schemata aufeinander bezogen." (Auer 1986: 24 and ibid. 26; emphasis in the original)

¹⁹ For details and the consequences for intercultural communication cf. Auer 1986: 26 with footnote 12.

switching qualify content in the sense that they suggest lines of inferences but they do not carry information as such.”

This observation follows as a direct consequence from the nature of contextualization cues themselves, because many of them “do not function as isolated signs; they cooccur with, are mapped onto or are pragmatically tied to, lexical signs” (ibid.), i.e. they are typically not lexically based and comprise much of what has been called paralinguistics by traditional linguistics. But what empirically validates an analysis in the framework of contextualization is the fact that speakers and hearers make use of and orient towards contextualization cues as a means for constraining the interpretation of their utterances. To use Gumperz’ (ibid. 48) words once more:

” ... if we look at the exchanges in their entirety we find that listeners responses and the uptake they elicit provide empirical evidence that inferences are shared and that sharing of inferences contributes significantly to the progress of the exchange.”

For us as analysts, this means that listeners’ responses can provide a means for giving empirically-based plausible interpretations of what is going on in the discourse that go beyond intuitive judgements, an advantage and necessity especially with respect to minimally marked or completely unmarked constructions. How recipients display their understanding(s) of previous utterances and thereby the relevance of contextualization for the establishment of meaning in connection with *paratactic conditionals*, will be explicated in detail in the following sections.

Intimately related to and virtually the foundation of contextualization theory is the concept of frames and framing respectively. The notion of ‘frame’ was first introduced by Bateson in 1955 to describe a level of interpretation concerning how a certain move is intended and is to be interpreted by others participating in the exchange. Observing monkeys at play, he was able to show that even animals use frames to interpret each other’s behaviour, signalling, for instance, ‘This is play, not serious fight’, and that

”no communicative move, verbal or nonverbal, could be understood without reference to a metacommunicative message, or metamessage, about what is going on - that is, what frame of interpretation applies to the move.” (Tannen 1993: 3)

Since its introduction the notion ‘frame’ - conceived as a cognitive-psychological concept and named after the “physical analogy of the picture frame” (Bateson 1972: 186) - has been taken up again and again by researchers from different, but often neighbouring disciplines. It was the sociologist Goffman (1974, 1981) who gave the notion of framing its most extensive treatment. A frame for Goffman - and also for the anthropologists Frake (1977) and Hymes (1974) - is a culturally determined, familiar activity making it possible to interpret and/or understand

utterances in the way they were intended. Participants have to know (and signal to each other) what frame they are in when they speak, i.e. whether the activity they are presently engaged in is, for example, in a serious or playful mode. Different traditions and disciplines have referred to more or less the same thing as 'frames', 'scripts', 'scenes', 'schemata', 'prototypes', 'speech activities' and 'modules'.²⁰ What unites these terms and the approaches behind them is the concept of "structures of expectations", i.e.

"on the basis of one's experience of the world ..., one organizes knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences. (...) ... the frame refers to an expectation about the world, based on prior experience, against which new experiences are measured and interpreted." (Tannen 1993: 16f.)

Framing can operate on more local (micro) and more global (macro) levels. That is, in principle two main types of framing may be discerned: framing on the discourse level and framing on the event level.²¹ What we will be occupied with in the next sections when dealing with the contextualization of *paratactic conditionals* involves framing on a more local or linguistic level, i.e. we will be dealing with linguistic constructions/practices rather than social actions or activities on a more global level.

3. The contextualization and framing of *paratactic conditionals* (PCs)

Paratactic conditionals are contextualized and framed by various and differently placed contextualization cues. Apart from the above mentioned differentiation between anticipatory /prospective and retrospective cues, conditionality can be signalled in the co-/context of the *PC*, in the *PC* itself, or in both. In fact, what Auer has called 'multiplicity of coding', i.e. the redundancy of contextualization cues to contextualize a certain linguistic move, can also be found with respect to *PCs*. So, the singling out of individual contextualization cues in what follows is to be understood as an analytic step and not meant to lead readers into believing that they occur in isolation. Rather, readers are encouraged to look at the excerpts presented retrospectively in a kind of synopsis. I decided to concentrate on the clearest instances in each case.

3.1 The contextualization of *PCs* in the co-/context

²⁰ For details on the use of specific terms by different disciplines cf. Tannen 1993a: 15ff.

²¹ For the use of these terms cf. Tannen 1993: 11f.

In about one fourth of all *PCs* (26% or 41 cases) in my data conditionality is signalled either prospectively or retrospectively, i.e. *PCs* are contextualized through diverse means, which like explicit *if*, are present in the immediate context of the conditional construction and serve to open up an alternative world. The following contextualization cues have been found: verbs like *imagine, suppose, (let's) assume, (let's) say, (just) hypothesize*, other conjunctive expressions like *when, every time, once*, disjunctive expressions like *whether (... or), otherwise, or (else)*, modal auxiliaries like *can, could, may, gonna, will, would*, questions and formulations like *(somebody)/(something) like*.

For example: In the following excerpt there is talk about the question of whether delinquents in Great Britain, instead of being imprisoned, should not rather be equipped with an electronic device, a so-called electronic bleeper, in order to constantly monitor their whereabouts. Among other things there is some discussion between Dick Hatch (DH), the moderator of the radio phone-in, and the caller Mrs. Etchalls (ET) about the advantages and disadvantages of this innovative technique, including its price in comparison to the 'traditional system':

(2) *Electronic beepers for prisoners*

1 DH: er (0.7)
no but **if** a crime **were** committed
it **could be** proved very
quickly **couldn't** it

5 ET: well it **could** but (.)
and also I think it's going to be a lot more
expense (1.2)

DH: wwell now wait a minute is it
I mean er (.) this is one of the points that was
10 made
mrs etchalls
that **once you've** bought one of those things
let's say it even costs a hundred pounds
-> p **you** stick it round the fellow's neck
15 **or** the lady's neck
-> q **or** whoever 'n' there it is (.)
that's **your** hundred pounds spent

ET: but who has to buy it (0.8)

DH: well the- the state has to buy [it but--

20 ET: [that's it you
see it's c- it's costing enough as it is for
prisoners in prison

The *paratactic conditional* in lines 14 to 16 (*you stick it round the fellow's neck ... and there it is*)²² is contextualized here by various lexical cues. In line 12 we have *once* and right in the next line we find *let's say*, both means to signal the evocation of (aspects of) the possible world in which using electronic beepers is assumed to be the reality. The (presumably) generic *you* in

²² *that's your hundred pounds spent* in line 17 is in construction with *once you've bought one of those things* in line 12.

line 14 and *your* (line 17)²³ as well as the disjunction introduced by *or* in the *PC* itself (lines 15 and 16) fulfill the same function, namely that of cueing in this alternative world.²⁴

In (3) the topic is the Gulf War and, more precisely, the question of whether Israel will retaliate, something the Americans have already spoken out against (line 2f.). Israel is deliberating over what they will do in case an international conference takes place: If it does not take place (line 11), they will not retaliate (line 12), but if it does (line 13), they will (line 14):

(3) *Israel's reaction*

1 S: but what **I think** what's going on now is
the United- the United States really doesn't want
them to retaliate
5 .hh and Israelis 're saying 'okay uhm
what's- the- () up on the table?
what's the diplomatic pay-off?
what **won't** you do
when the peace treaty comes down?
what's **gonna** be your reat- attitude towards an
10 international conference?
-> p1 no international conference
-> q1 we **won't** retaliate
-> p2 international conference
-> q2 we go'
15 L: let me uh please [uh interrupt
S: [I'm not saying that's happening
but
L: let me- ((end of tape))

The pair of contrastive phrasal²⁵ *PCs* (lines 11-14) is contextualized through, first of all, the overall speculative nature of the passage hinted at by *I think what's going on now* in line 1 and the prospective contextualization cue of two questions before the *PCs*, one with a *when*-clause (line 7f.), the other a *what*-question (line 9f.). Questions have often been brought up in connection with condition(al)s because in the two construction-types the propositional content is not presupposed. They constitute speech acts of a non-assertive nature; they are non-factual, i.e. their most important feature is their 'openness'.²⁶ Furthermore the semi-modals in line 7

²³ Generic expressions like *you/your* etc. open up alternative worlds insofar as they depart from the present discourse-world of the participants because of their non-referential nature (although they might include in their generic reading the recipient).

²⁴ The reader is also referred to the explicit conditional construction with *if* in lines 2 to 4 (and the resumption of its apodosis in line 5) as the clearest contextualization cue. We will come to that, however, in more detail below. Cf. also 3.2. below for the fact that *paratactic conditionals* can either 're-enact' precisely the same alternative world that was construed explicitly before or just share with their contextualization cues the action of evoking *some* alternative world.

²⁵ *Paratactic conditionals* in which the protasis consists only of a phrase and their peculiarities are discussed in some detail in Thumm 1999: 109ff.

²⁶ For details cf. 4. The contextualization of *PCs* through cues in the *PC* itself and 4.1.4. *p* has interrogative form or rising intonation.

(*won't*) and 9 (*gonna*) contribute to signalling (implicit) conditionality or the evocation of an alternative world.

In the next instance questions in the immediate environment serve as contextualization cues for the two *PCs* in line 14 and 24f./27 respectively:

(4) *Electrical equipment*

1 RI: why- why was there- why was it rubbish (0.8)
 [did he say
 DG: [well he reckons after the- after about a year
 the parts start to- all these working- you know
 5 coz they're all this sort of (0.5) ultra thin
 modern (.)
 [they slide out and all this
 BE: [well (1.1) **don't you**-
 DG: business they- they tend to go wrong very
 10 quickly
you can't get 'em repaired
 BE: well **don't you** find that with anything
 electrical or like that
 -> *p* and *q*
 15 DG: [**the more** ()]- [oh yes
 yeah
 BE: it's the same w- with televisions and m-motor
 cars
 even you get [--
 20 SA: [you can't guarantee [**can you**
 BE: [no
 but with these Amstrad
don't you think that er (0.5) s-
 -> *p* and *q*
 25 **you** give a dog a bad name **and- and**
 it's a [(.)
 DG: [yeah
 -> .. BE: jolly good- hard job to get rid of it
 you know what I mean (1.7)
 but uhm (0.8)
 30 **might** not be the case
 Amstrad they **might** be rubbish (0.7)
 what do you David
 do you think they are?

Here, the participants are talking about the premature breaking down of electrical equipment and are even speculating that these failures may be built into the products on purpose. Starting from a concrete case (line 1f. and 22), DG reports (lines 3-7) what the dealer told him on the respective item. In line 8 BE tries to get the floor, resulting in an overlap with DG's line 7. She struggles to bridge this by the use of the discourse marker *well* (here in the function of a floor holding/-getting device) and a 1.1 sec. pause, but then abandons her efforts as DG continues talking. In line 12 BE takes up her abandoned construction with exactly the same formulation: *well don't you ...*²⁷ Clearly, this is syntactically marked as a question, which contextualizes the

²⁷ Interestingly enough, the discourse marker *well* is repeated here as well, something which does normally not happen with such items.

following *PC* in the sense that it signals ‘openness’, i.e. non-assertivity like the *PC* itself, thereby indexing the frame ‘alternative world’. The conditional generalizes and brings what was said before with respect to a special case to a closure of general validity (cf. the generic *you* in line 14 as well as in the question preceding it (line 12, the reformulation of line 8), and even before, in line 11; cf. also the *you* in the second *PC* in line 24). BE then lists other cases (*televisions, motor cars*; line 17f.) for which the same is true, before, again in a generalizing fashion, giving expression to her belief that the products of the brand at issue here are not as bad as their reputation might suggest (line 24f./27). The *PC*, which has a gnomic character just as in line 14²⁸ is contextualized via two questions preceding it: SA’s tag question (*can you*; line 20) and BE’s *don’t you think that er* (line 23), which is structurally similar to the question in line 12. The *might* in lines 30 and 31 and the question in line 32f. retrospectively confirm the cueing of the possible world presented before.

In the following excerpt from a radio phone-in dealing with pet problems, conditionality is indexed by the modal *wouldn’t* (line 2), which can be said to open up an alternative space and contextualize the *paratactic conditional* in line 4-6. The same can be said about the generic *you* (line 4) in the protasis of the *PC* itself:

(5) *Goldfish*

1 NI: uhm
but I- I **wouldn’t** recommend goldfish bowls
() thing about goldfish bowls
-> p **you** leave it out in the open
5 and in the .hh hot air and things
-> q the poor thing almost gets boiled
that’s one thing that happens to it
but I think also they suffer from real sort of
personality problems
10 because they think everybody is looking at them
all the time
and they’ve nowhere to hide
fishes like little places they can get in an’ out
to sort of disappear for a little while
15 so **if** they’ve got nowhere to do that
and it is like being - as you say

²⁸ Note also that in line 26 DG comes in with a non-competitive, confirmatory minimal turn (backchannel), resulting in a recognitional onset after the protasis at the beginning of the apodosis and showing the ‘recognition’ of the proverb-like status of the *PC* by DG. Recognitional onset is defined by Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998: 56) as “the next speaker recognizes what current speaker is saying and can project its completion, even if that is before the end of a turn-construction unit”. DGs *oh yes* in line 15 can be interpreted similarly, and even his aborted construction at the beginning of line 15 (*the more-*) can be seen as a confirmatory, equally gnomic and generic implicit conditional construction of the sort *the more, the merrier* (Fillmore’s (1987: 164) BCHF-construction). For some details on this construction-type to express conditionality cf. Thumm 1999: 5. Interestingly enough, BE starts her proverb-like *PC* in precise overlap with DG’s *the more, the merrier*-construction, which is abandoned in the first part, i.e. here, “two speakers - independently but simultaneously - produce the same object in the same structural position. This thereby provides some “proof” of the relevance, or appropriateness, of the production of such an object in just such a slot.” (Drew & Holt 1988: 414) “Thus each of these speakers employs an idiom to draw the story to a [potential - MT] close. They do so at the same moment, displaying their independent [but identical - MT] analyses of this being the [possible - MT] point to conclude ...” (ibid. 416).

living in a goldfish bowl

See also the explicit conditional construction with *if* in line 15ff., which retrospectively frames the *PC*.

3.2 The framing of *PCs*

In the preceding discussion it became apparent that *PCs* are often 'surrounded by' conditional constructions explicitly marked with *if* in their co-/context. I will speak of framing rather than contextualization in such cases because here, the frame/script/schema 'talking conditionally' or 'opening up possible worlds/alternative spaces' is made explicit in the context. By contrast, in contextualization the frame 'what we are engaged in at the moment is speaking about alternative worlds' is only indexed, i.e. 'hinted at' or 'alluded to', by the contextualization cues. Like contextualization cues, conditional framing can occur before or after the *PC*. The former case I refer to as anticipatory or prospective conditional framing; it is attested in 35 cases (or 22%) in my data.²⁹ The latter I call retrospective framing; it was found 30 times (or 19%) in my data. A further differentiation with respect to the framing of *PCs* can be made along another axis: I consider as cases of framing not only instances in which the *PC* contains the same propositional content as the explicit version by which it is framed, but also such instances in which the *PC* and its explicit frame are, in terms of the propositional content, 'not about the same thing'. Let us first, however, consider an example of the first category:

(6) *Car (breast cancer)*

1 B: have you heard the latest with Beth?
 did she tell you
 C: °I know that she's moving°
 B: she is no longer going to a doctor (.)
5 **if** she is dying of cancer she is just going to die
 she's °not going to have any more check ups°
 C: great
 B: full stop (.) because I [talked to doctor Messer
 C: [perfectly right
10 B: my doctor [in Attigen
-> p C: [get (.) run over by a car (.)
-> q just (.) bleed in the street
 don't worry about it
 A: hhhi hhhi
15 C: I agree

²⁹ In the literature I have also found instances of *PCs* that can be considered to be 'framed' by explicit conditional *ifs* preceding them. Cf. Davies 1986: 182, where, however, contexts are invented artificially and *ex eventu*. Moreover, the acceptability of *PCs* is made dependent upon the 'choice of the appropriate context' (in which in both of Davies' examples *if* occurs!). On the one hand, this confirms my hypothesis of framing of *PCs* in the sense that the presence of explicit constructions in the immediate context of a lexically minimally marked or implicitly conditional construction facilitates the understanding of the latter, but, on the other, I can only emphasize the unempirical and therefore highly questionable nature of such a methodology relying on analysts' judgements of well-formedness.

(1.5)
 B: but I'd talked to doctor Messer and he ...

Here, B is trying to get some information from C about the state of health of their mutual acquaintance Beth, who is suffering from a special kind of cancer (line 1f.). C answers that she knows that she is moving (line 3). Then, B informs C about Beth's latest attitude towards her illness: She won't go to a doctor any more, if she dies of cancer, she will just die without having any more check-ups (lines 4-6). C resumes exactly the contingency-relationship of the *if*-clause in the *PC* in line 11f, which is thereby prospectively framed by the explicit conditional. The *PC* clearly refers back to the latter as far as the propositional content is concerned (at least in a metaphorical way), but, at the same time, the content is couched in a more generic, proverb/aphorism-like, laconic, virtually sarcastic, metaphoric formulation (often also supported by the use of *you* with generic reference), signalling, at the same time, (thematic) closure of some sort.³⁰

Excerpt (7) below exemplifies the action of evoking an alternative world with an anticipatory conditional *if*-construction framing a *paratactic conditional*. Here, *if* (in combination with contextualization cues; cf. for example *can* in line 12, the backshifting of verb forms in the *if*-conditional and the resumptive, conditional apodosis marker *then* in line 9 and 15, respectively) sets the frame for the action of 'opening up a possible world' without, however, anticipating the propositional content of the following *PC*:

(7) *Joint bank account*

1 JS: a joint account doesn't mean that half is mine and
 half is yours
 it means
 .hh **if** I **if-** **if** you and I **were** married .hh and I
 5 **put** (.)
 all my uh all my earnings in the bank
 and you **didn't** work
 D: uhu
 JS: **then** that's my money
 10 it's not your money
 it's just you have the right to withdraw it and
 you **can** write cheques on it (.)
 but it's still my money for uh state tax purposes
 (.)
 15 **if** it **were** your money **then** you **wouldn't** pay tax on
 it (.)
 D: ((pause)) well I- I mean I- I heard I was ALWAYS
 under the UNDERSTANDING that a JOINT bank account-
 .hh what the PURPOSE of that was- ONE of the purposes
 20 is
 -> p it's uh- ONE of the parties DIES
 -> q the OTHER party only pays a tax on that - HALF that
 they don't OWN

³⁰ Cf. Thumm 1999:152ff. for the specific (discourse) functions of *PCs*, especially in comparison to lexically marked *if-then* conditional constructions. For the topically terminal character of idiomatic expressions cf. again Drew & Holt 1988.

25 JS: that's not CORRECT. (pause) you were under a MISCONCEPTION.

In the radio show this passage is taken from, tax advisor John Stein (JS) is giving information and advice to callers on various problems. What is at issue here is the functioning of a joint bank account. The evocation of a possible world in the *PC* (line 21f.) is prepared through two explicit conditionals preceding the *PC*: *if I if- if you and I were married and I put all my earnings in the bank and you didn't work then that's my money* (line 4-9) and *if it were your money then you wouldn't pay tax on it* (line 15f.). The *PC* in line 21f. does not have the same content as the preceding explicit conditionals, although they are – in the broadest sense – somehow 'about the same thing', i.e. coherent in terms of an overall discourse topic (joint bank account). But what most clearly relates them to each other is the action of 'speaking conditionally' made explicit in the conditional *if*-clauses, which serves as a frame of understanding and interpretation for the *PC*.

Not only are *paratactic conditionals* framed prospectively, but they are also very frequently followed by explicit *if*-constructions functioning as retrospective framing devices. This is not to say that a recipient interprets a *PC* as conditional (and therefore understands it) only when the explicit construction has been produced, but, rather, that this explicit form contributes retrospectively in combination with other contextualization cues to confirming the cueing, and thereby the interpretation of the action. As with anticipatory conditional framing, in retrospective framing the explicit construction can either resume the same propositional content of the *PC* or merely have in common the action of evoking an alternative world. Excerpt (8) is an example of the first case, where the content of the *if*-conditional (line 15f.) is the same as in the *PC* (line 13f.) except that *p* is negated:

(8) *Politicians needing constant attention*

1 T: No.
I don't get that kind of attention.
I mean,
5 I don't come to people's houses,
and say,
you know,
vote for me, =
love me, =
10 read about me, =
care about me, =
it's important to me,
<< rhythmic > I just do this show.
-> *p* ↑People wanna turn it on,
-> *q* fine.
15 **If** they don't,
fine. >
It's not the same thing. (.)
But a guy whose major motivation ...

Here, Tury Ryder, the moderator of a radio show, distances herself from the way politicians try to attract attention and increase their popularity. She disapproves of their behaviour and the efforts taken by them; she, in contrast, does not (have to) care much about how many people listen to her show: If people like it and (therefore) turn it on, she considers it okay (line 13f.), and if they do not like it and (therefore) don't listen to it, she considers that okay, too (line 15f.).³¹ The two conditional constructions form a pair expressing a contrast in the protasis: *people turn it on* and *people don't turn it on*, respectively. Strategically, the first of the possible worlds, in which people like her show and want to listen to it, is coded linguistically as being more likely than the second: The former is not marked with *if*, i.e. it is not superficially presented as hypothetical. The syntactic form of the *p* of the *PC* (*people wanna turn it on*; line 13) is structurally identical to a pure affirmative. The explicit construction with *if*, on the other hand, suggests that this case is less probable. The use of the *PC* can, therefore, be seen as a strategic choice on the part of the speaker to subtly convey a certain preference. For this purpose the speaker relies on the specific function of *PCs*: they are neither committed to the truth/factuality of *p* (as are temporal *when*-clauses) nor to the overtly conditional-hypothetical nature of constructions lexically marked with *if*. Due to its inherent potential ambiguity *PCs* are very often located on an epistemic scale between temporals and *if*-conditionals. It is (among others) this feature that makes *PCs* discourse-pragmatically more appropriate in specific contexts, as for instance the above.³²

The passage in (9) below shows the phenomenon of retrospective framing of a *PC* through an explicit *if*, where the latter construction sets the former into the frame 'opening up of an alternative world' without 'repeating' the content of the contingency-relation that was construed asyndetically before:

(9) *Commercial*

```

1      PH:  page two. .hh
-> p1   <<acc> have a problem with your teeth, =
-> q1   you go to a dentist of course. =
-> p2   have a legal problem, =
-> q2 5  you call a lawyer >. (...) .h
        please-
        if you have a problem with the tap water in your
        house;
        or in your office;
10     will you call a specialist? (.)
        call a rain soft dealer?
        with the rain soft man water treatment isn't just
        a sideline; =
        it's his ↑only business.
15     he studies constantly to become better at it. =

```

³¹ What we have here, then, is a *paratactic conditional* in the speech-act domain.

³² For a detailed discussion of the functions and overlaps with cognitively related concepts of *PCs* cf. Thumm 1999: 89ff. and 152ff.

most rainsoft dealers are certified specialists, =
certified by the waterconditioning association, .h
and licensed by the forty year-old ...

In this advertisement for a plumbing firm, read out by Paul Harvey (PH) in the studio, three alternative worlds are opened up: In the first *PC* in line 2f. a world is evoked in which one has toothache (*p1*) and normally (cf. the generic *you*) goes to see a dentist (*q1*). In line 4f. a world in which a lawyer is consulted (*q2*) is presented as being contingently dependent upon having a legal problem (*p2*), again formulated in paratactic-asyndetic fashion. Then, these two *PCs* are framed retrospectively through an *if*-construction, which makes the action of opening up possible worlds explicit (line 7-9): here, a third alternative world is evoked in which problems with the tap water in the house (line 7-9) result³³ in calling a specialist from the firm being advertised.

Retrospective framing (and contextualization) is interesting also from another point of view: Taking an onomasiological approach to conditionality involves (among other things) the problem of how to unambiguously identify a *PC*. Framing a *PC* by an explicit conditional can be used as analytic evidence that what a speaker was engaged in when producing the *PC* was indeed meant to be a contingency-relation. Methodologically, it is important to conceive of discourse as an autonomous and inherently self-explanatory universe, i.e. to rely uniquely on recipients' and speakers' treatment of the utterance in which the structure under investigation - in our case a *PC* - occurs. The use of next-turn-proof-procedures helps minimize the risk of imposing analysts' interpretations from outside the discourse universe upon the data. Instead, interpretations are checked against, and, in fact, based on the understandings (and the display of these) of the participants at talk themselves. The ideal case of a next speaker referring back to a paratactic-asyndetic conditional construal with an explicitly marked utterance that makes clear that he understood the preceding structure as involving a conditional contingency-relation, is, unfortunately, not attested in my data.³⁴ But in the preceding examples we at least encountered cases in which same speakers in their next-to-the-*PC* turns use the conditional conjunction *if*, partly with respect to the same relation between *p* and *q*, partly with respect to the same action of evoking a possible world. The presence of lexical elements such as *if* provides the analyst with clear evidence that the conditionality was present for a participant and that he displays it as being present (as an intended meaning for the speaker, and, in the ideal,

³³ Or they are at least supposed to do so - cf. the interrogative form of the apodosis (line 10), the general intention behind the advertisement being supported by the content of the two *PCs*, which suggest self-evidence and are intended to do so also for the content expressed in the *if*-construction.

³⁴ In an investigation on asyndetic causal structures in spoken German, Gohl (2000) reports that she has found 2 cases in which a next speaker takes up with an explicitly causal construction the causal relation between the same two states of affairs that was constructed asyndetically before by the former speaker.

but rare case, as an understanding for the recipient) in the relation of some preceding unit of talk. Somewhat weaker evidence, but still evidence, of a similar kind can be seen in line 14f. of excerpt (4) above³⁵, where two speakers start to produce asyndetic-paratactic conditional structures simultaneously. DG's *the more* shows that conditionality was 'in the air' so to speak in prior talk, although no one has, up to that point, uttered anything resembling a *PC*. Instead, both speakers simultaneously take up the conditionality suggested by the prior talk of all parties.

4. The contextualization of *PCs* through cues in the *PC* itself

In addition to contextualization cues and framing devices in the immediate context, *paratactic conditionals* in my data are massively marked as conditional by various cues within the *PC* itself. These cues occur in the protasis as well as the apodosis of *PCs*.

4.1 Contextualization cues in the protasis

4.1.1 Backshifted verb forms in *p*

The cueing of an alternative world within the protasis of a *PC* is typically achieved through the use of backshifted verb forms, known from traditional accounts of *if*-clauses and school grammar.³⁶ As about 92% of the *PCs* under investigation are of the indefinitus-type (traditionally, but misleadingly, called realis or likely/probable condition) and are therefore marked with zero in *p*³⁷ this type of contextualization is restricted to potentialis (hypothetical)³⁸ and irrealis (counterfactual) *PCs*. The existence of these has been variously denied in the literature, namely by Davies (1979, 1986) and Lawler (1975)³⁹, a claim clearly invalidated in its exclusiveness by my (1999) empirical findings⁴⁰, where potentialis cases were found 3 times, counterfactuals in at least one instance, not counting so-called mixed cases, where protasis and apodosis show different degrees of epistemicity (as is also found with explicit conditionals). One of the former is (10) below, where the speaker considers or, rather, presents the becoming-a-fact of *p* as being completely hypothetical:

³⁵ Cf. also the discussion there.

³⁶ For the correlations of past tense verb forms and greater degrees of hypotheticality cf. James (1982) and Fleischman (1989).

³⁷ This is because they do not occupy any specific point on the epistemicity scale, i.e. it is completely open whether *p* is going to come true and thereby also make the consequent become true.

³⁸ Properly, this category should be subdivided into potentialis/hypothetical (or, counter to expectation) and present counterfactual (i.e. counter to a present fact). Traditionally, counterfactual only means past counterfactual, i.e. counter to a past fact.

³⁹ For details on this point cf. Thumm 1999: 65ff. and 95ff.

⁴⁰ Further empirical evidence for the existence of *PCs* with degrees of epistemicity lower on the scale comes from a small collection of *PCs* from written (literary) texts, not included in my (1999) investigation, but used as a means for comparison.

(10) *Test case*

1 D: I ↑wonder what the fine is
if there was-
if you went all the way << l >with something like
that;>
-> p 5 somebody took a test << l > case like that;>
hauled their kid in
.hh you know and says
"I just caught this kid smoking
he's under twenty"
10 (now) this is a sale to a minor
" ↑where did he get the cigarettes.
well go back to where he bought the cigarettes
and let's jump on the vender"
-> q what would happen then (.)
15 that would be interesting
wouldn't it
do they ever ask- has everyone ever been asked for
an ID
when you're buying cigarettes

In the passage before that above the speaker (D) has reported that one is almost certain to meet minors smoking cigarettes when one happens to drive past any school. Now he is speculating on what the consequences would be (*I wonder what the fine is*; line 1), were one to prosecute that kind of breaking of the law (*if you went all the way with something like that*; line 3f.). This contingency-relation is coded by an explicit construction with *if* (cf. again line 3f.). After that, he suggests an imaginary scenario with a *PC*, in which he constructs an exemplary test case (*somebody took a test case like that*; line 5).⁴¹ Both the explicit constructions with *if* (line 2 and its reformulation in line 3), and the paratactic formulation contain verb forms with past tense morphology (*was*, *went*, *took*), i.e. backshifting, which marks all of the three conditional protases as potentialis. What follows in line 6-13 is a broad elaboration of the alternative world just opened up; in line 14, *q*, the possible consequence, in the form of a question (*what would happen then*), closes this inserted sequence, thereby framing, and, in fact, retrospectively establishing the *paratactic conditional*.⁴² Notice also that the marking of the potentialis epistemic standpoint is achieved through the backshifting of the *will* in typical fashion for the apodosis: *would happen* (line 14). Likewise in the uptake in line 15 (*that would be interesting*) as well as in the tag question in line 16 (*wouldn't it*). The typical marker of conditional apodoses, *then*, is also present in line 14. A phenomenon described by Couper-Kuhlen (1999: 107) might be present in the inserted sequence of lines 6-13, which elaborates on the possible world presented in line 5.

⁴¹ The 'reading' that the explicit *ifs* of line 2 and 3 belong also to the *p* of our *PC* (which, in that case, wouldn't be one) in line 5 is ruled out when intonation is taken into account: lines 3-4 and 5 form two separate intonation units and line 4 ends with a mid-fall, signalling (potential) completion.

⁴² Contra Couper-Kuhlen (1999: 107) "Despite the fact that both [condition and consequent - MT] involve backshifting in *p* and the use of *would* in *q*, they allow material to intervene between condition and consequent" I see in this specific type of marking the very reason (not a potential reason against it) for the fact that other (i.e. differently marked) material can intervene between *p* and *q* at all.

Interestingly enough, this extension is not exclusively coded in backshifted 'past-tense' verb forms: *hauled* (line 6) is backshifted and continues *took* (line 5), but *says* in line 7 is not; this, rather, is to be interpreted as historical present that presents the hypothetical world as the actual one and introduces the direct speech of the one who is imagined to have caught the kid smoking in line 8f. The narrator animates the catcher's voice via 'direct quotation', in which *caught* (line 8) does not constitute a backshifted verb form, but is a real past tense with past time reference. Line 10, *now this is a sale to a minor*, is, on intonational grounds, best interpreted as the narrator's, i.e. D's, voice again, commenting on the imagined scenario. From line 11 to 13, we, again, hear the voice of the one who caught the minor smoking probably speaking to the authorities, i.e. *did he get* (line 11) and *he bought* (line 12) have past time reference. Couper-Kuhlen (ibid. 107) comments: "... backshifting in an expansion of *p* need not be maintained." A possible explanation for this could be that setting a potentialis conditional frame once in line 5 (and before by *if* and backshifted verb forms in lines 2 and 3)⁴³ suffices to mark the sequence up to the continuation of the conditional by its apodosis in line 14 as embedded into, and therefore belonging to this conditional. Once the frame 'potential alternative world' has been established, conditional marking becomes optional.

Let us next consider the case of a past irrealis *PC*⁴⁴, i.e. where the alternative world presented in *p* is construed as counterfactual, because it is counter to a past fact:

(11) *Invasion of Japan*

1 BH: .hhh now
 .hh **if** the Japanese **had been** the FIRST (.)
 to MANUFACTURE- develop and MANUFACTURE the atomic
 weapon
 5 and had it working
 NN: mhm
 BH: do you think THEY **would have used** it
 [I think-
 NN: [I don't think, I think that's a mute QUESTION
 10 BH: I don't THINK it's a mute question
 I think it's a very IMPORTANT question
 NN: our country HAS- for- the first use of atomic
 WEAPONS
 and I think we HAVE to- if ANYTHING at least- do a
 15 little SOUL-SEARCHING.=
 and I don't see even our country doing THAT
 I think they're- they're so PROUD of this
 technological INNOVATION
 .hh and I- I think it's something that we should
 20 have a DAY of repentance every YEAR as they have
 in JAPAN
 .h a day of MOURNING
 and this country doesn't MOURN- for- for something
 so TRAGIC,
 25 no matter WHAT the reason.

⁴³ Cf. section 3.2. above.

⁴⁴ For an example of a present counterfactual *PC* the reader is referred to Thumm 1999: 98f.

and th- THAT'S what I'm scared (of),=
 I'm talking about the FUTURE, NOW.
 and- this COUNTRY still hasn't come to GRIPS with
 it the- the HORRIBLENESS of the nuclear ARMS race.
 30 BH: okay let me ask you a QUESTION then.
 and - and - and this - this is FACT, this is
 HISTORY.
 -> *p* the EXPERTS at the time said that we **INVADED** the-
 the homeland of JAPAN- the mainland-
 -> *q* 35 there **would have been** a MILLION casualties.
 NN: that's what the MILITARY EXPERTS of the UNITED
 STATES say.

This is an excerpt from a radio phone-in with the topic of Hiroshima and atomic weapons in general. The caller (NN) disapproves of the throwing of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the treatment of this historical fact in the American public, where there is no mourning about this 'wrong decision' but instead even a feeling of pride for this kind of technological innovation. Bernie Hermann, the moderator, tries to convince him that the decision was the right one to take, arguing that it has been unmistakably proven (cf. line 31f.: *fact, history*) that an invasion by infantry (*we invaded the mainland of Japan* = *p*; line 33f.) would have had as its result many more casualties (*there would have been a million casualties* = *q*; line 35). He presents the consequence in *q* as being contingent upon the state of affairs described in *p*. Strangely enough, only *q* is morphologically marked as an irrealis of the past (*would have been*; line 35), whereas *invaded* (line 33) in the protasis shows only simple backshifting, although semantically the alternative world in *p* clearly is neither a future possibility (potentialis) nor a fact that is counter to the present (irrealis of the present), rather, the world described here is one which clearly is counter to a past fact.

How can the use of verb morphology in this seemingly 'mixed case' be accounted for, then? The answer to that question becomes clearer when we consider the immediate linguistic context this *PC* is embedded in: Syntactically, *p* is subordinate to an object clause, dependent upon the structure *the experts at the time said* (line 33) and appended to it by the complementizer *that*. What we have here, then, is the reproduction of another person's speech, i.e. a case of reported speech. The choice of the past tense verb form *invaded* (line 33) in *p* and the change of construction can therefore be explained as follows: The report of the military experts' original utterance (probably *we invade the mainland of Japan, there will be a million casualties*) begins in the form of a simply backshifted reproduction embedded by BH under *that*. The consequent of the *PC*, however, (*there would have been a million casualties*; line 35) shows double backshifting⁴⁵ and clearly contextualizes a possible world which from today's (or, to be more precise, Bernie Hermann's) situation is counterfactual, because it is counter to a (now) past fact. The speaker (BH) abandons his construction (cf. also the self-interruptions) and continues, in a

⁴⁵ Perhaps (probably) it is not a reproduction at all, but BH's original utterance.

change of perspective, with a past irrealis world in the apodosis what before was begun as an indefinitus of the (military experts') present.⁴⁶ Together with the contextualization cue in the apodosis (backshifted *will* + past infinitive) and the general discourse context the verbal form in *p* clearly contextualizes this *PC* as involving a counterfactual condition.

For the contextualization of 'mixed worlds', i.e. *PCs* where *p* and *q* pertain to worlds that are (formally) situated on different points of the epistemicity scale and actually refer to different times the reader is referred to Thumm 1999: 101ff.

4.1.2 Lexical means such as the verbs *can*, *could*, *think*, *imagine*, *say* and *let* in *p*

Apart from the prototypical contextualization cues of backshifted verb forms, there are numerous lexical means that contribute to cueing alternative worlds in the antecedent of paratactic conditional structures. Most typical are the verbs *can*, *could*, *think*, *imagine*, *say* and *let* as markers that signal 'what we are engaged in at the moment is the evocation of a scenario that departs from the present (discourse) world'. Let us consider (12) below:

(12) *Black and female persons in leading positions*

1 Bush: I think our Cabinet members are key people
 I think the woman that works with me
 Rose Zamaria
 is as tough as a boot out there
 5 and can make some discipline and protects the taxpayer
 look at our Cabinet-
 (-> *p*) you talk about somebody strong-
 (-> *q*) look at Carla Hills
 look at Lynn Martin who's fighting against this glass
 10 ceiling and doing a first class job on it-
 look at our Surgeon General Dr. Novella-
 -> *p* and *q* you **can** look all around **and** you'll see first class strong
 women-
 uhm Jim Baker's a man-
 15 yeah-
 I agree-
 I plead guilty to that-
 but look ...

Here, the former US president Bush is defending himself against reproaches that he preferably and to an unjustified extent employs only white men as members in his cabinet, especially in leading positions. In our excerpt he starts listing individual women as counter examples. A first possible *PC*, not, however, in the focus of our attention at the moment, can be found in line 7f.:

⁴⁶ Another account for a similar *if-then* construction that might also hold in *PCs* as the above is provided by Couper-Kuhlen (1999: 103): "One explanation of this use is that the simple past vs. pluperfect distinction for *p* may be in the process of neutralizing in counterfactual *if-then* constructions." In this understanding the *we* in line 33 of (11) above would have to be interpreted as meaning 'we - all the Americans', and the whole *PC* as containing reported speech in *p* and *q*.

with *p* (*you talk about somebody strong*) Bush takes up the reproacher's argument that no 'strong' woman, i.e. with some amount of power and influence, is a member of his cabinet in a (contextually) given *p* (if, as you just did, you talk about somebody strong)⁴⁷ and continues in the consequent of the *PC* with the suggestion to consider the cases of Carla Hills, Lynn Martin and Dr. Novella, all cases that, according to him, invalidate the criticism levelled against him. What we have here then, is a conditional relation in the speech-act domain formulated asyndetically: 'If you talk about somebody strong, then let us consider that I perform the following speech act: "Look at Carla Hills ..."'⁴⁸ What is of interest to us with respect to contextualization is the *PC* in line 12f., in which Bush summarizes the aforementioned examples in a general statement construed as a conditional with *and*. What helps to index a possible world in which someone (I take the *you* in line 12 to be generic rather than referring only to the specific reproacher) 'looks all around' is the *can* (line 12) in the protasis. This cueing of conditionality is supported by cues in the apodosis: the coordinating conjunction *and* as well as the (future) modal *will* mark *and you'll see first class strong woman* as the consequence of the world presented in *p*.

4.1.3 The negative polarity item (NPI) *any* in *p*

In Thumm (1999) I was able to show that another lexical element, namely *any*, not only triggers a (slightly) negative interpretation by virtue of its non-assertive nature, as is claimed in the literature (Lawler 1975, Quirk et al. 1985), but by opening a pragmatic scale in Fauconnier's (1975) sense can function as a means of evoking a possible world and therefore serve as a contextualization cue in *PCs* and signal conditionality itself.⁴⁹ *Any* in the sense of an unspecified number or 'it doesn't matter who/which/what' shows an occurrence of about 6% (or 9 items) in the protases of the *PCs* in my data. One of these is (13):

(13) *Breast cancer/aids*

	1	G:	I can't believe you women you really upset me (.) .hh becuz you allow this money to go for aids that they've taken from breast cancer resch-
	5		research
-> <i>p1</i>	/P		you talk to any research doctor
-> <i>and q1</i>	/P		and find out how much money has been taken from you ladies
		BC:	okay
	10	G:	for aids research

⁴⁷ For a discussion of given conditionals and their relation to *PCs* cf. Thumm 1999 passim.

⁴⁸ For details on *PCs* in different pragmatic domains cf. Thumm 1999: 69ff.

⁴⁹ For details cf. Thumm 1999: 31ff. and the discussion on Lawler (1975) and Bolinger (1977) *ibid.* 50ff.

-> Q
 BC: it's just ridiculous
 okay but Gord it's not the same money
 [and aids is important
 G: [it's the same money it's taken
 (-> p2) 15 you talk to the research
 (-> and q2) **and** they'll say their their money has been
 cut

Here, Gord (G), whose wife is suffering from breast cancer, is calling in on a radio phone-in moderated by Barbara Carlson (BC). Today's topic is this particular sort of cancer. The caller expresses his concern about the decreasing amount of money that is spent on the prevention and treatment of this illness, because it is, according to him, transferred to aids research, and about the indifference of those concerned. At the first arrow (line 6) he sums up his previous argument in the form of a *PC* by projecting (a) possible world(s) through the use of *any* in the protasis. This is a world in which one (cf. the generic *you* in line 6) can speak to whatever research doctor and the result will be (continuation with *and* + apodosis) their constant claim that the money for breast cancer has been cut in favour of aids research (cf. *q1* = lines 7f./10). This is the understanding that BC displays by her *okay* in line 9. (The fact that BC in line 12 resumes her *okay* and elaborates on it provides further evidence that BC's *okay* is not only a minimal turn confirmatory in nature, i.e. a continuer in terms of backchannelling, but rather a proper turn in its own right.) She has arguably interpreted G's turn in line 7f. as complete (a TCU has come to an end with *you ladies* in line 8), and therefore as a possible point of speaker transition. In line 10, G, however, elaborates or modifies his prior turn in a post-expansion of *q1*: *for aids research*. Retrospectively for BC, G continues the *PC* by presenting the epistemic *Q* in line 11 (*it's just ridiculous*), thereby reinterpreting lines 6-8 as a whole as the protasis *P*: 'If you talk to whatever research doctor and (if you then) find out how much money has been taken from you ladies for aids research, (then) you'll conclude (as I do) that it's ridiculous.' After, BC asks G in line 12f. to consider that it probably is not the same money and that aids research is important as well, G insists that it is the same money (lines 14-17) and that the researchers say that their money has been cut, if asked about it. This is coded in a second *PC* (lines 15-17) with generic *you* in *p2* and generic *they/their* in *q2*. Apart from its function as a contextualization cue for conditionality the *any* in *p1* contributes to the generic character of the *PC* and lends the utterance a nuance of universal validity by virtue of its sense 'whoever/whatever'.⁵⁰

4.1.4 *p* has interrogative form or rising intonation

In about 8% (13 instances) of the *PCs* in my data the whole of the protasis serves as a cue to signal conditionality by virtue of its morpho-syntactic interrogative or intonational form. The

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the *some-any* distinction in (paratactic) conditional protases cf. Thumm 1999: 134.

it could easily be punctuated *You want me? (Well, then) come and get me.*"
(BOLINGER *ibid.* 173)

Generally speaking, this shows that spoken language cannot unambiguously be translated into a written form by orthographic representation, or, that an ambiguity between an interrogative and a conditional understanding has to be 'resolved' in this process. Furthermore, it is evidence for the relevance of this basic differentiation and at the same time shows how poor a copy the written version of an utterance is in comparison to its original. Above all, it shows that the spoken medium is primary, written language only constituting a secondary representation thereof.

In excerpt (14) below the protasis (lines 10-12) of the *PC* is formed by a question proper, i.e. an interrogative that is morpho-syntactically recognizable as one, as it shows subject-operator inversion. This syntactic form of *p* (together with the resumptive *then*, the prototypical cue for conditionals in *q*) contextualizes the construction as conditional. Clearly, examples like these are borderline cases, where one might argue that what is involved is a question proper and a result clause, i.e. that we should rather speak of consecutivity than of conditionality. But an important fact must not be overlooked: In not a single case in my data is there any evidence that the question was meant as a question with its full illocutionary (and perlocutionary) force by the speaker, for there is never any expectation of an answer (there isn't any pause after *p* in one single instance), but rather speakers go immediately on to presenting the consequence, i.e. apodosis, signalling that the conditional construction has been pre-planned as a holistic unit, as in (14):

(14) *Election campaign*

1 MH: uhm
 well I-
 I'm surprised that Jerry Hayes has even dared to
 go out on the doorstep
5 JH: I mean I've got uh
 JH: good reception in Harlow
 MH: well I've got one quote
 from one of the candidates
 who has put on his leaflet
-> *p* 10 "**are you depressed**
 unhappy
 suicidal
-> *q* **then** think what it's like for me
 as a Conservative candidate
 in the present political climate"
15 JH: but it's tongue in cheek
 you know that
 [it's a very funny leaflet
 MH: [well there's another can-
20 Jerry
 Jerry
 let me just say

The same contextualization procedure can operate with the contextualization cue 'intonation' alone. Questions formed by final rising question intonation (called 'declarative questions' by Quirk et al. 1985: 814 because of their syntactic form) have the same function in *PCs* as morpho-syntactically marked interrogatives, namely to index the evocation of a possible world. This is exemplified by extract (15):

(15) *Balcony*

1	A:	"auntie ~lina's here again, I am leaving." so she wants to [go out on the balcony,
	L:	[(H)
5	A:	I grab her again, and I go, no kids on the balcony.
-> <i>p</i>		you wanna go outside?
-> <i>q</i>		you gotta go downstairs,
10	L:	((yawn))
	A:	but you're not going out on the balcony. cause knowing you, you're gonna fall off.

Here, A opens up an alternative world in *p* (line 8) through her declarative question with rising final intonation. In this world her niece Francesca (cf. the *she*-reference in line 3, the *her* in line 5 and the *you*-address in the direct speech presented as a report in lines 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13) wants to go outside because her aunt Alina (A) (who is reporting the scene described in our passage to a friend Lenore (L)) is there again and she obviously does not like her (cf. line 1f., which is to be interpreted as the reported speech of Francesca, here animated by A). In a world in which the protasis becomes true, the speech-act in *q* becomes relevant: *you gotta go downstairs* (line 9), because for reasons of safety A does not allow children to go out on the balcony (cf. lines 3/5, 7 and 11-13).

As is expectable in a lexically minimally/unmarked construction as *PCs*, intonational form is often a decisive factor in cueing conditionality:

" ... exactly as with questions, intonation can be the main cue to the fact that a clause is meant to be conditional. This is because, as with questions, any major syntactic type can express a condition, and intonation may therefore make the difference." (BOLINGER 1989: 173; emphasis MT)

This obviously valid statement is especially true for that group of *PCs* which lacks any other means of signalling conditionality (cf. the categories discussed above). In my data intonation in

30% (48 occurrences out of 159) of the cases serves as the main and often only contextualization cue.⁵²

One of the main questions that arises in this connection is whether there is any specific intonational pattern that is characteristic of the construction under consideration, and if so, how this configuration might be approached descriptively.

According to Bolinger (1989: 173) what he calls a B profile is most likely to occur in *paratactic conditionals*. He describes it as a question format characterized by a rising pitch movement at the end of the protasis, signalling 'more to come', and usually showing a rising, level, or sometimes even falling pitch over any following unaccented syllables (cf. *ibid.* 3). This format, says Bolinger (*ibid.* 174), may be accompanied by (additionally kinetically contextualizing) gestures like "raised eyebrows", "outflared hands" and "raised shoulders". Moreover, B profiles generally are "the best subordinators, being the most up in the air" (*id.* 1984: 411).

Other intonational configurations can serve the same function of expressing conditionality. Thus Bolinger (1989: 174f.) considers his AC and C profiles under certain circumstances as being able to signal an *if-then* relation, because they possess a final rise in the pitch movement, and, if used on *p*, signal 'more to come' or a 'then'-consequence through this non-finality. The examination of Bolinger's claims, however, needs further empirical testing. For a more detailed account of general questions of intonation (going beyond the description of its function under the aspect of contextualization) with respect to *paratactic conditionals*, especially to concessive *PCs* cf. Thumm 1999: 140ff.

In sum, what emerges from the discussion in Thumm 1999: 140ff. is that it is those intonational patterns that end in a rising pitch movement (either from a fall (AC and C) or a rise (B) over the protasis), signalling 'more to come' by virtue of their "terminal rise", their "general up-in-the-airness" (Bolinger 1984: 407) which seem to be particularly apt for cueing conditionality in *PCs*. This non-final contour indexes some sort of 'openness', which can be interpreted as iconically reflecting (similar to questions) the 'semantic openness', i.e. the non-assertivity of conditional protases, especially those of *PCs*, where lexical contextualization cues are lacking as support. Bolinger's B profile seems to be particularly apt for that purpose.

It is tempting to conclude that there is such a thing as a typical 'intonation of (paratactic) conditional clauses'. But we have seen that there is more than one intonational gestalt that is possible in signalling conditionality. Moreover, the same profiles are also used for other purposes, as for example type B for interrogatives. There is therefore no 1:1-relationship

⁵² Apart from possible cues in the context. But in these cases there are no other cues in either *p* or *q*. Example (15) above is a case in point.

between intonation (form) and meaning; intonation is, as are other contextualization cues, relational-indexical, not referential in nature:

"The "meaning" and function of intonation is ... assumed to be a relational one. Intonation is conceived of as an autonomous signalling system which is mapped onto locutionary textual structures. (...) Intonation in co-occurrence with syntactic, semantic and other locutionary properties is used as a contextualization device in conversational activities to signal the status and contextual presuppositions of segments and utterances." (Selting 1992: 237)

But intonation as a contextualization cue for *PCs* can be said to have an iconic basis, as in semiotics it is assumed today that the triad arbitrariness, indexicality and iconicity forms a continuum, rather than three separate categories.⁵³ Certain profiles are more apt than others to signal conditionality because of their imagic iconic basis in the sense that the rising, and therefore non-terminal, open nature of these configurations depicts the conceptual openness or non-assertivity characteristic of conditionality.

The conclusion that Bolinger (1989: 176) draws for the intonational configuration of conditionals without *if* "there are no defining intonations, but there are facilitating ones, particularly B and AC profiles" is generally confirmed by my data. There is no single, absolutely definable intonation contour that is valid for all *PCs*. Yet the ascription of particular functions to specific profiles as proposed by Bolinger (ibid. 176f., 1986: 175), according to which B profiles convey a "not -my-responsibility tone" (Bolinger 1989: 177), making them particularly apt for gnomic expressions, whereas AC involves "concern and involvement of the speaker" (ibid.) and makes an assertion in its own right instead of merely repeating a formula (as does B) and is therefore often associated with warnings, can only be partly agreed with. B profiles are by far too frequent in *PCs* in my data to be universally understood as proverbial expressions as Bolinger's (ibid.) *Easy come, easy go* or *Ask me no questions, I tell you no lies*.

In excerpt (15) above, we already encountered a clear case of a B profile in the function of cueing conditionality in a *PC*. The continuous rise in pitch, which is characteristic of this so-called question-format, over the protasis is present also in the next extract:

(16) *Life expectancy*

1 PH: Americans are living longer than ever before
 average life expectancy for women is now 78
 point 9 years,
 for men 72-
5 once one gets passed the precarious first year of

⁵³ The problem of the iconicity of intonation is discussed more fully in Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996: 20f. and Selting 1992: 252f.


```

                                life, =
                                much longer. (..)
-> p                                .h You:: (.) make it to 65? =
-> q                                your life expectancy jumps to <<h + acc> 82 point
10                                4 > years; =
                                and the AMA says, =
                                that with self-discipline,
                                relating to: <<acc> smoking and drinking and
                                eating> and sex;
15                                with self-discipline,
                                the average American should enjoy a healthy
                                painfree hundred;
                                years.

```

Here, a news reporter (PH) presents the most recent figures concerning the life expectancy of Americans. After having explicated three cases in lines 2-7, he opens up a fourth alternative world in the *PC* of line 8f., whose *p* ends in a rise with the contour slightly falling over *q*, thereby contextualizing the construction as conditional: The non-assertability of the hypothesis that one reaches the age of 65 is iconically reflected in the ‘openness’ signalled by the intonation over the protasis.

4.2 Contextualization cues in the apodosis

Contextualization cues also occur in the apodosis of *paratactic conditionals*. In about 40% of the *PCs* in the data conditionality is indexed in this way, typically by modals, backshifted verb forms and resumptive particles like *then*. In the preceding discussion the reader’s attention was sometimes drawn to these phenomena in passing. But let us consider (17) more fully:

(17) *Jokes by Jey Lennox: Princess Stephanie (bodyguard)*

```

1      Princess Stephanie
      of Monaco
      you know her
      <<acc> very beautiful woman >
5      well she’s expecting her second child (..)
      by her (.) bodyguard. ((laughter and cries by the
      audience))
      Her bodyguard is the father of her two children.
      You get the idea this guy has been guarding her
10     body just a little too close ya- I- ((Laughter,
      cries and applause))
      I think- ((L, c + a)) jahha
      I think he- I think he need to stand back a little
      bit. ((laughter))
15     Ya ha I think he is a ha little too close to her.
      That is tha ha problem.
-> p,q  You stand back a little bit, you won’t have these
      problems.
      The guy: what?
20     what am I doin’ wrong,
      you know. (.)

```

In this excerpt Jey Lennox is making fun of a bodyguard of Stephanie of Monaco's and his all too 'thorough conception' of the profession of a 'bodyguard' based on the fact that she is expecting her second child from him. In the antecedent of the *PC* in line 17f. Jey Lennox opens up an alternative world in which Stephanie's bodyguard keeps at a distance from her, resulting in his having no problems any more. This consequent clause is marked with the future modal *won't*, the prototypical marking of indefinitus conditionals in *q*. Apart from the intonation of the *PC*, this marking constitutes the only contextualization cue indexing that a contingency-relation is present here. For further contextualization cues in the apodosis cf. the preceding examples: *won't* (line 12) in (3), *would* (line 14 and 15) and *wouldn't* (line 16) in (10), *would have been* (line 35) in (11), *you'll see* (line 12) in (12), *they'll say* (line 16) in (13), and *then* (line 13) in (14).

5. Conclusion

The study of contextualization and framing of *paratactic conditionals* has revealed that speakers deploy a wide range of contextualization cues and framing devices to index conditionality in this lexically unmarked structure. The status of an utterance as being within the frame of 'talking conditionally', i.e. 'the evocation of possible worlds', is signalled through diverse lexical as well as non-lexical means, both prospectively/anticipatorily, i.e. by cues preceding the yet-to-be contextualized *PC*, and retrospectively by cues following the construction. Moreover, it has become apparent that a distinction can be made with respect to whether contextualization cues occur in the co-/context of *PCs* or within the *PCs* themselves, in which case a further distinction becomes relevant, namely whether cues appear in the protasis or apodosis.

Framing by explicit, i.e. lexically marked, constructions either before or after the *paratactic conditional* was argued to be different in so far as conditionality is not hinted at but instead explicitly encoded, thereby framing, i.e. setting into the proper frame of understanding, a lexically minimally (or even completely un-) coded semantic relation (between two clauses).

Furthermore it has emerged that speakers contextualize *PCs* cumulatively, i.e. the action 'what I am/we are engaged in at the moment is the opening up of possible worlds' is cued by multiple contextualization cues and framing devices, i.e. linguistic practices, at the same time. A major role is played by intonation in indexing conditionality in *PCs*; in particular what Bolinger has referred to as the B profile seems to be especially apt for signalling conditionality due to its prototypical rising pitch contour over *p*, which has been interpreted iconically as corresponding to the non-assertivity or 'openness' of conditional protases (which in turn derives from their function of setting a hypothesis, i.e. departing from the present discourse world to evoke an

alternative world). Apart from the fact that speakers design their discourse for their recipients in order to convey the intended meaning, hearers could be shown to be oriented to the frame 'possible worlds', too.

Investigating asyndetic-paratactic relations, and conditional ones especially, from an onomasiological perspective involves an enormous number of methodological and analytic problems, among others the question of how to unambiguously identify such structures and demarcate them from neighbouring conceptual domains, in our case temporality, causality, concessivity and consecutivity. The study of the contextualization of *PCs* has shown that contextualization theory can contribute a great deal to that task.

What seems to be needed, then, among other things, for a theory of the lexicon which takes what are traditionally called pragmatically linked logical relations between clauses into account, is what Dancygier & Sweetser (2000: 138) have described as an

"analysis which uses parameters of constructional meaning (verb forms, clause order, intonation, use of mental space builders) to outline the range of constructions which participate in the construal of related meanings (...) and explores the similarities and differences between the constructions with respect to these parameters. ... such an analysis can reveal generalizations and aspects of constructional meaning which accounts of individual conjunctions can describe only partially."

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